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INTRODUCTION CONCLUSIONS
The review is organised around
some of the main claims made in
support of what has appeared to
successive Governments to be an
evidently good thing. These are: (i)
that parents want greater curriculum
choice; (ii) that specialisation is
quite different from selection; (iii)
that diversity through specialisation
will raise educational standards in
and beyond the specialist schools
themselves. Although it is too soon
for a decisive assessment of the
validity of those claims, the weight
of evidence supports the following
conclusions :-
There is no evident parental demand
for specialised forms of curriculum.
In the British, particularly the
English, context, specialisation as a
means of diversifying and
modernising the school curriculum
confronts a formidable obstacle —
the continuing high prestige of the
traditional-academic curriculum.
Specialisation is hard to separate
from selection, certainly in
conditions where schools compete
for pupils and especially for those
likely to enhance their position on
school performance tables.
‘Selection by interest’ also tends to
produce socially segregated intakes.
The early identification of aptitude
for particular subjects, defined as
promise rather than achievement,
remains a problem without
technically well-grounded and
educationally acceptable solutions.
Without valid evidence that
specialist schools are more
effective, the extent to which they
are preferentially funded is
inequitable; being good across the
curriculum remains a form of
distinction without specific rewards
unless the new ‘beacon’ status is
seen to provide it.
In its first education White Paper, the new Labour
Government declared its intention of ‘modernising
comprehensive secondary education’ by overcoming
the ‘tendency to uniformity’ which had marked it in the
past. It therefore ‘relaunched’ its predecessor’s
Special ist Schools Programme through which
secondary schools are encouraged to develop ‘their
own distinctive identity and expertise’ in one of four
‘specialist subject areas’. By January 1998, 29O of
these specialist schools had already been designated
in a hundred English Local Authorit ies — 210
Technology Colleges, 50 Language Colleges, 17 Sports
Colleges and 13 Arts Colleges. Sixty had been
designated since the May 1997 Election, and Labour’s
Secretary of State placed them ‘at the heart of a drive
for diversity and excellence within a modernised school
system’ which would ‘cater for individual strengths’
rather than offering ‘a bland sameness for all’. He hoped
to see their numbers rise to 450, about one in seven
maintained secondary schools, by the end of the present
Parliament. [1]
The tangible benefits of the status have not changed
since the Election, nor have some conditions for
acquiring it. £100,000 of private sector sponsorship has
to be secured, a large sum which schools are very
differently placed by their location and contacts to
obtain. This is then matched by £100,000 capital grant
from the Department (DfEE), which also gives £100 per
pupil additional recurrent funding for least three years
(up to a yearly maximum of £100,000). In return, the
school must have a three-year development plan with
quantified performance targets for its specialist area,
and must ‘build ongoing links with sponsors’. There are
however some significant changes since the Election.
Lacking its predecessor’s enthusiasm for competition,
the Labour Government insists that specialist schools
must make their distinctive expertise and resources
widely available to ‘local people and neighbouring
schools’ rather than to gain market advantage. Selecting
up to 10% intake by ‘relevant aptitude’ must not be
misused as a means of introducing or restoring partial
selection by ‘general academic ability’. And preference
is to be given to applications from schools in those areas
of socio-economic deprivation designated as Education
Action Zones.
The purpose of this Briefing Paper is not to argue for or
against the specialist schools policy, but to review
evidence relevant to assessing its more likely effects.
The schools are still so new that most of the research
involved more general investigations of educational
choice which had to be applied to this particular
sponsoring of diversity. Some is from countries where
curriculum diversity emerged earlier, although any
‘lessons from abroad’ have to be applied cautiously with
due regard for the different education systems and
cultures from which they are taken.
CLAIM 1. PARENTS WANT GREATER
CURRICULUM CHOICE, AND ENTERPRISING
SCHOOLS RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.
Greater consumer choice of schooling, a policy objective
pursued in many countries since the early 1980s, has
seemed to require secondary schools to be different in
kind and not merely more and less effective versions of
the same model. Demand for ‘schools of faith’ has
grown, as has support for schools with a distinctive
educational or social philosophy. But while more parents
have become inclined to look beyond their local school
for a preferable alternative, extensive research into what
they are looking for has produced little evidence that
they want, or that schools are providing, different kinds
of curriculum.[2]
In this country, Conservative Ministers often claimed
that the Local Authority ‘monopoly’ of public education
had suppressed a ‘natural’ demand for variety which
the self-governing grant-maintained schools would
therefore lead the way to satisfying. Yet there is no
evidence that either parents or schools associate that
status with curriculum change.[3] More generally,
research into parents’ reasons for choosing one
secondary school over another has not yet revealed
any substantial demand for departures from a traditional
academic curriculum ‘successfully’ taught. Parents may
also look for good facilities for science and technology,
a good reputation for sport (especially where the child’s
view has been actively canvassed), or a good reputation
for music or drama. But none of these specific concerns
has appeared among the ‘most important’ criteria — a
school’s results, its intake, and the likelihood that the
child wil l  be ‘happy’ and ‘safe’ there.[4] While
competition for pupils (especially academically able
pupils from ‘good homes’) has certainly prompted some
energetic marketing, this has tended strongly to focus
on maintaining or enhancing a general reputation as a
‘good school’ which is rarely associated by parents with
specific organisational or curriculum characteristics. It
has certainly not involved targeting particular kinds of
consumer with a distinctive form of curriculum.[5]
There is therefore little evidence of schools responding
spontaneously to what they perceive to be a new or
emerging consumer demand. What specialisation has
occurred has been initiated largely from above, most
conspicuously in the creation of city technology colleges
(CTCs) in the late 1980s and then through the
inducements provided by the 1993 Technology Schools
Initiative (TSI) and its subsequent extension through
the Specialist Schools Programme to other areas of
the curriculum. The CTCs were explicitly intended to
stimulate consumer demand for a distinctively modern,
high-technology version of secondary education. Yet
despite their publicised image as ‘the schools of the
future’, the parents who certainly applied in large
numbers were more inclined to see them as better
resourced with better intakes than neighbouring
comprehensives schools, and as combining high-tech
facilities with traditional values and a measure of
selectiveness.[6] Justifying the continuing priority given
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visibly, than to doing anything distinctively different. It
is not difficult to understand why. In so far as they are
more market-oriented than LEA-maintained schools,
then the safest ‘product’ to market is traditional
academic quality, especially where priority is given to
recruiting able pupils and pupils from middle-class
homes. If they emphasise part of the curriculum at all,
it is unlikely to be technology because this has
connotations of vocational training which are not easily
reconciled with a high academic reputation. The general
conclusion of that research was that the workings of a
quasi-market ‘appears to be pulling all schools of
whatever type towards conformity’ rather than towards
seeking a distinctive market niche.[12]
very similar terms to those later employed in the 1997
White Paper.[17]
Evidence suggests that they are not so easily separated.
Several American school systems have ‘magnetised’
all their schools in a complementary division of labour
between different specialisms which might provide a
model for Labour’s vision of ‘families of schools’ in large
urban areas sharing their expertise. But Magnet schools
are normally a selected set of schools within the public
system. Claims that their intakes are less socially
selective than those of either suburban or inner-city high
schools have to be taken with other evidence that they
tend to attract relatively high proportions of
academically-motivated students to the disadvantage
of other schools, either because they are seen as being
generally ‘different’ and ‘better’ or because of the
attractions of the more ‘academic’ specialisms which
some of them offer. Reference to such high profile
‘speciality schools’ as the Bronx High School of Science
or the Boston Latin School are especially inappropriate
because these schools select by ability rather than by
interest. A survey of the rapid spread of Magnet schools
to most large urban districts reported that nearly 20%
of the schools studied were ‘highly’,  ‘very’ or
‘moderately’ selective, and that many others had been
able to take advantage of their image of catering for
abler, better motivated students to shape their intakes
so as to confirm it.[18]
It is clearly possible to develop and to market a
curriculum speciality without using it either to select
applicants openly or to engage in covert selection. Many
Magnet schools avoid selectiveness, and some are
required to ‘select’ by ballot when there are too many
applicants. In this country, a specialist school may
simply be the neighbourhood school which has decided
to emphasise a curriculum strength. But where it offers
one specialism among the several available to parents
and children in that locality, what does it do if demand
exceeds supply? Believing in selection, whether by
ability or aptitude, the Conservative Government had a
ready answer. Wishing to restore grammar schools, it
would also have allowed specialist schools to select up
to 30% of their intake (and grant-maintained schools
up to 50%) if its last (1996) Education Bill had become
law. The matter is much more complicated for Labour
Ministers because while they support specialisation,
they also reject selection by ‘general academic ability’.
Any secondary school is to be allowed to select not
more than 10% of its intake, but the Clause in the School
Standards and Framework Bill (Clause 93[2]) which
‘permits’ limited selection by ‘aptitude for particular
subjects’ also excludes new testing of ‘ability or . . . to
elicit any aptitude other than for the subject or subjects
in question’. In the Standing Committee discussion of
that Clause, the Conservative ‘Shadow’ Minister
(Stephen Dorrell) dismissed the distinction between
testing ability and testing aptitude as ‘an extraordinarily
rotten floorboard’ on which to stand; the Liberal
Democrat Don Foster accepted the concept of aptitude,
but claimed that ‘no-one has yet devised a means of
assessing it’; and the Minister (Stephen Byers) both
provided a working definition of the concept and insisted
that schools like Emmanuel CTC in Gateshead had
shown how it could be assessed. Ability, he argued, is
‘what the child has already achieved’. Aptitude is ‘a
natural talent and interest that a child has in a specific
subject’; it is ‘potential which might flourish and blossom
if  the chi ld  is  exposed to par t icu lar  types of
education’.[19]
While research cannot resolve the conceptual
confusion, it does not support the Minister’s apparent
confidence that the practical problem can be solved.
Indeed, as working examples of selection (and self-
selection) by interest as well as by aptitude, the CTCs
illustrate some of the problems. These schools were
required by the contracts with government to recruit
intakes representative of their catchment areas by ability
and social background. But they were also required to
select by ‘general aptitude’ (from evidence of attainment
and progress at Primary school) and by a ‘readiness
for’ and ‘likelihood to benefit from’ that ‘type’ of education
to technology in the Conservative Government’s
promotion of curriculum diversity, Gillian Shephard
argued that it was in the national interest to transform
through lively publicity and special funding the image
of technical schools as ‘drilling the second-rate for oily
rag jobs in factories’.[7] The consequent inducements
are illustrated in two research studies, neither of which
suggested that the school concerned was already
excelling in its ‘chosen’ speciality. An investigation of
secondary school recruitment in three ‘local competitive
markets’ found only one example of curriculum
differentiation, a comprehensive school’s development
of technology as a bid for the extra TSI resources. And
a grant-maintained girls’ school included in a study of
school choice in three London LEAs had received by
1994 £500,000 from the TSI, a further £800,000 for extra
science facilities and other ‘plant improvement’, and to
have made a further successful bid to the Toyota
Technology Fund.[8]
The lack of evidence so far of schools diversifying
spontaneously may indicate only a lack of incentives
until recently to play to their strengths. Any inclinations
to do so have also been held in check by the
requirements of a National Curriculum initially
constructed in such timetable-consuming form that it
left schools no scope for specialising within it. Even the
self-consciously innovative CTCs had to offer the full
‘broad and balanced’ version, extra time being created
for technology and science through a longer school day
and a longer school year. And although the 1988
Education Reform Act made provision for schools to
opt-out of the National Curriculum in order to carry out
‘development work’ and ‘experiments’, that escape
route was not used.[9] The Dearing review of the
statutory requirements then freed (in theory) up to 40%
of the secondary curriculum for schools to ‘respond to
local circumstances’ or seek a distinctive niche in the
local market. This freedom has largely been used to
extend pupil choice within a school’s range of non-
foundation ‘arts’ and ‘vocational’ subjects rather than
to specialise.
It is therefore worth looking to the private sector for
examples of diversity because it represents a long-
established market not formally bound by the National
Curriculum. While the sector has its ‘progressive’ and
experimental schools, and although parents pay for
private education (especially in small proprietary
schools) for many reasons, the dominant reputation and
image of private education comes from the academic
performance of the market leaders. The Independent
Schools Information Service (ISIS) defines their appeal
to parents as ‘high academic standards, high
expectations of children, a firm disciplinary framework,
and smaller class sizes’. A different curriculum has not
been part of that appeal except in some ‘progressive’
and some small proprietary schools.[10] Even in
countries where the private sector is both more
extensive and lacks the peculiarly English association
with elite schooling, its main attraction is for those
dissatisfied with academic standards and discipline in
the available public schools or who seek a distinctive
religious or philosophical orientation.[11]
In these countries, but especially in England, the strong
association of a traditional-academic curriculum with
prestigious schools, selection, and middle-class pupils,
has made significant departures from it appear risky.
This is the curriculum which has the appeal of familiarity.
It is also the curriculum which continues to provide the
main route to educational success and consequently
enhanced job prospects. In market theory, an
enterprising school would identify an unsatisfied
consumer demand and position itself to meet it. But it
would be a bold school which responded to competition
from more academically ‘successful’ neighbours by
offering a distinctively ‘modern’ or ‘vocationally relevant’
alternative. As indicated earlier, even CTCs tended to
complement their modernity with more traditional
virtues. Successive studies of grant-maintained
secondary schools in operation have shown a much
stronger tendency towards a ‘re-invigorated
traditionalism’, doing traditional things better or more
The heading of this section embodies a difference more
easily defined in principle than in practice. In the 1992
Education White Paper Choice and Diversity  for
example, specialisation is defined as enabling parents
to choose the kind of school which best meets their
child’s interests and needs, whereas selection enables
schools to do the choosing. But by also expressing its
wish to see schools develop ‘a distinctive character’
without being thereby arranged in ‘tiers’ in a single
hierarchy of esteem, the Conservative Government
accepted in effect that ‘specialisation without selection’
is only possible if parental demand is spread around a
range of alternatives.
There is strong research support for that proposition.
An OECD survey of the effects of choice in six countries
concluded that where demand is heavily concentrated
on a dominant model of the ‘good school’, then the
schools which most closely resemble that model will
be over-chosen and so be able to pick the more
desirable applicants. The alternative situation of ‘a range
of preferences matched by a variety of school types’ is
therefore a ‘happier ideal’. But it is also ‘an ideal more
rarely fulfilled’.[13] Even in Germany, where the
relatively high status of the technically-oriented
Realschule has been cited to justify apparently similar
diversity in England, the academic and selective
Gymnasien have continued to dominate the market.[14]
Other cross-national evidence also indicates strongly
that ‘as long as schools tend to be judged on a scale of
academic excellence’, parental choice reinforces ‘the
existing hierarchy of schools based on academic test
results and social class’.[15]
From that perspective, the Labour Government’s
support for specialist schools can be defended (at least
in large urban areas) as a strategy for avoiding that
effect by dispersing demand around a range of
alternatives so that parents will have different reasons
for making different choices. A frequently cited example
of how this can be done successfully is the American
Magnet schools. These were designed primarily to resist
the segregated intakes of neighbourhood schools by
using the ‘magnetic’ pull of a specialised curriculum (or
a distinctive cultural ethos or distinctive educational
philosophy) to attract students voluntarily across racial
and social-class lines. Whether they recruited by ability
or simply by interest, they would be less socially
selective than either the ‘best’ urban neighbourhood
schools or high schools in the more affluent suburbs.[16]
Arguing in 1993 against the Conservative education
reforms because they were ‘encouraging the tendency
of markets to redistribute resources from the weak to
the strong’, Michael Barber (now heading the Labour
Government’s Standards and Effectiveness Unit) cited
the success of Magnet schools and other ‘alternative
curriculum’ programmes in attracting a wide non-
selective social and ethnic mix and involving parents
more actively in schools which they had positively
chosen. His argument that specialisation was therefore
an altogether ‘different issue’ from the harmful practice
of selection by ‘overall academic ability’ was made in
CLAIM 2. SPECIALISATION IS QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM SELECTION;
RECRUITMENT BY APTITUDE IS QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM RECRUITMENT BY
GENERAL ABILITY.
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as demonstrated by tests and at interview. Their parents
also had to demonstrate at interview their commitment
to the CTCs’ intended ethos of ‘enterprise, self-reliance
and responsibility’. The assessment both of pupil
aptitude and family suitability was therefore unusually
overt. It afflicted some senior CTCs’ staff with severe
doubts about the practicality of the process, and brought
suggestions from within the CTC ‘movement’ that
random selection would be fairer where there were too
many ‘interested’ applicants for the school to admit.[20]
Some specialist schools, such as the Royal Ballet
School, and the Chetham’s and Yehudi Menuhin Music
Schools, are of course well practised in assessing
performing skills at the point of entry. But their example
is largely irrelevant to assessing less tangible aptitudes
or ‘natural talents’ supposedly separable from the prior
effects of home background, schooling, and special
tuition. In relation to the science and technology
specialism of the CTCs, two reports commissioned by
the Department for Education and Employment were
inconclusive about the validity of aptitude testing. One
produced no evidence of a consistent relationship
between pupils’ apparent aptitude at entry and their
subsequent examination performance in that subject
area. The other reported very different views of whether
and how ability and aptitude could be separated in
practice, with two CTCs refusing to use aptitude tests
because applicants were too young to be categorised
in that way and/or because the tests could not eliminate
effects of prior learning and parental
encouragement.[21] CTCs generally showed more
confidence in interviews as a way of identifying ‘interest’.
These have been rejected by the Labour Government
except where used by church schools to confirm the
appropriate religious affiliation, presumably because
they are known to favour children from socially
advantaged and ‘educated’ homes.
Among the more general findings from research into
secondary school recruitment are that the proportion
of parents who get their first choice has not obviously
risen since the late 1980s; that the less transparent the
procedures and the less overt the criteria, the greater
the unfairness; that there are considerable social class
differences in the types of school preferred, reflecting
processes of self-selection through which some parents
aware of the popularity of a school may fall back on a
more ‘realistic’ choice; and that greater parental choice
has not reduced and may have increased, the social
segregation of school intakes.[22] A main conclusion
from an extensive survey of comprehensive secondary
education was that ‘specialisation is unlikely to be
achieved without selection in a fiercely competitive
market’ such as operated in many urban areas.[23] It
takes this review back to the difficulty of separating the
two processes.
Even the appearance of being partly selective seems
both to increase the attractiveness of a school to
ambitious, ‘educated’ and confident parents and to skew
the intake in their direction by discouraging some
parents from applying at all. This has been evident in
the studies of recruitment to CTCs cited earlier, and
from the relatively low proportions of children from low
income families in many grant-maintained schools
compared with LEA-maintained schools nearby.[24] As
noted earlier in relation to Magnet schools, the
appearance of being different from the ‘ordinary’ can
also help recruitment. The 10% limit on selection by
aptitude is justified by the Government as sufficient to
support diversity but low enough not to change the
‘character’ of a school. It is certainly too low in itself to
transform the fortunes of an unpopular school. But if
the specialism permeates the curriculum, which is what
it is hoped will happen, then its effects on recruitment
may extend well beyond the formal limit.
The potential marketing disadvantages of a technical
orientation (other than in high-tech versions) are
avoided because Technology Colleges also ‘specialise’
in science and mathematics. But the Arts and perhaps
the Language Colleges may attract more than their
‘share’ of girls, who are regarded by some schools
seeking to improve their position in the performance
tables as a valuable resource. Recent research into
the effects of parental choice in London indicated that
‘unusual talent’ in (for example) music and dance was
being used by some schools to increase the proportion
of academically able children from middle-class
families.[25] Such partial selection may fulfil the Magnet
objective of making a school more truly comprehensive
in ability and family background than if it recruited
entirely or mainly from its neighbourhood. But it may
also enable over-subscribed schools to favour
applicants thought likely to enhance future results and
unlikely to be a drain on resources. Contemporary
French research found that secondary schools wishing
to improve the academic quality of their intake tended
to display that intention by emphasising modern
languages or mathematics, or by introducing special
options in dead or more exotic languages; comparative
research in Israel and the United States supports
predictions that low-status parents may be channelled
towards ‘zone’ (neighbourhood) schools which have no
specialised curriculum offerings and poor resources.[26]
too soon to claim the speciality ‘spills over into other
curriculum areas, making the school attractive to
teachers of all subjects’ and creating unusual
opportunities for independent learning, or to determine
whether specialist schools are being ‘genuinely
encouraged to adopt different educational models rather
than merely competing for funds attached to labels such
as “technology colleges”’.[30] It is certainly too early to
identify a distinctive specialised ‘style of education’, a
phrase used to justify opening up membership of the
City Technology Colleges Trust to ‘affiliated schools’
which had adopted or wished to adopt the same
educational ‘style’. A small minority of Magnet schools
offer a distinctive pedagogy, but they are not generally
known for innovations in teaching and learning.
They have prompted, however, many comparisons of
their performance with unspecialised ‘zone’
(neighbourhood) schools. For reasons noted earlier, the
evidence is inconclusive. In school systems which are
partly ‘magnetised’, student achievements in Magnet
schools are generally somewhat better. But some
Magnet programmes are school-wide, some are
available only to selected students, some are integrated
through the curriculum and some are set apart as an
addition. As indicated earlier, some Magnet schools are
openly selective and many others attract an unusually
high proportion of able applicants from ‘educated’
families Their apparently greater effectiveness could
be the result of a capacity to select pupils from whom
academic success is easier to obtain.[31]
The CTCs may appear to offer a more relevant example
of the effects of specialisation because their intakes
are supposed to be representative of the areas from
which they recruit. In the 1997 school performance
tables, almost all CTCs were well above the average
for their LEA. But large differences between them (for
example, from 34% to 89% in the proportion of GCSE
entrants achieving 5 or more A-C passes) suggest
considerable differences in their intakes and illustrate
the difficulty of generalising about the causal effects of
specialisation itself. If this is the case for relatively well-
established CTCs, it is even more misleading to cite
the numbers of much newer specialist schools among
the ‘best performing’ and ‘most improved’
comprehensive schools of 1997 if the implication is that
specialisation had caused their relative success.[32] For
those which were already ‘good’ or ‘improving’, their
recently acquired status is as yet more a reward for
past achievement; for those which were not, it is too
soon to establish an explanation for their improvement.
The Government’s expectation is that these schools
will provide local and regional ‘centres of achievement
and excellence in their specialist subjects’, and be a
focal point for revitalising education in areas of ‘social
disadvantage’. This is why every new Education Action
Zone is intended to have at least one. There are loud
echoes here of the ‘beacons of excellence’ role
highlighted in the CTCs’ mission. Certainly conditions
are more favourable for specialist schools to perform
that function. The CTC programme aroused strong
objections nationally because of their favourable
funding, and some CTCs faced additional hostility from
neighbouring schools threatened by the appearance of
a new and apparently favoured competitor in inner-city
and other urban areas still experiencing falling rolls and
the closure or merging of established schools. Schools
in the Specialist Programme are redesignated not newly
created or rebuilt, although their additional funding may
cause some resentment. It is the Government’s intention
that they will use their special expertise for the benefit
of the local community and not to secure the market
advantage which their distinctiveness and extra
resources may bring. Yet the potential is there for
another level in a hierarchy of schools. From this wider
perspective, the Magnet model is important but
complicated. As noted earlier, evidence of their generally
greater effectiveness has to be placed in the context of
somewhat favoured intakes, the effects on recruitment
and standards elsewhere, and indications that those
worst served by the pre-Magnetised system are under-
represented among the beneficiaries of the new. Since
The proposition that specialist schools are likely to be
especially effective is partly an application of more
general findings about the benefits to schools of defining
their core business clearly and recruiting students (and
staff) accordingly. But moving from that general
proposition to the benefits of a particular curriculum
focus is complicated. Although those located in
Education Action Zones seem likely to be given unusual
freedom to depart from or even to ‘re-design’ the
National Curriculum, specialist schools have to enhance
their chosen subject area without undermining other
subjects to make room for it. They would therefore seem
to be extending rather than reducing their task. Evidence
of the beneficial effects of more clearly defined purposes
comes mainly from schools which represent
‘communities of values’ with parents who share the
same religious or philosophical beliefs, or from schools
enabled by highly selected intakes to maintain a
pervasive academic orientation.[27] It is not obvious
that a specialised curriculum would provide a similar
sense of common purpose. Curriculum differences have
received very little attention in school effectiveness
research, the strong tendency to concentrate on school
organisation and leadership reflecting the lack until
recently of substantial curriculum differences to be
investigated. A typical conclusion, that curriculum
content made no difference to pupil achievement, is
the more significant for coming from research in the
Netherlands where parental choice has been unusually
extensive and the private sector unusually large.[28]
Indeed, the international comparisons often favoured
by advocates of a more open market in schooling tend
to show the higher-achieving systems to be those with
a consistently common curriculum.[29]
Yet belief in the motivating effects of different kinds of
learning goes back a long way. Thus the tripartite system
of ‘secondary education for all’ constructed after 1944
was justified on the grounds that children did best when
the curriculum was shaped by a pervasive (rather than
subject-specific) emphasis, and that the types of mind
suited to ‘academic’ or ‘technical’ or ‘practical’ modes
of learning could be identified quite accurately as early
as the age of 11. Scepticism about the validity of such
early assessment was reinforced by objections to
restricting access to a full ‘liberal’ education because
much of it was assumed to be too difficult for most
children and irrelevant to their future employment.
Comprehensive secondary education was intended to
override those assumptions. The breadth of the National
Curriculum then challenged directly both social-class
and gender stereotyping of subject ‘choice’. The
Specialist Schools Programme represents a move away
from ‘uniformity’, with beneficial effects expected to
extend well beyond the specialism itself. Yet it is surely
CLAIM 3. SPECIALISED SCHOOLS ARE
MORE EFFECTIVE; GREATER CURRICULUM
DIVERSITY WILL THEREFORE HELP TO
RAISE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS.
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CONCLUSION
the association of high school performance with socially
and academically ‘balanced’ intakes is strong, the claim
that ‘diversity and specialism will boost standards’ [33]
can only be properly tested by looking beyond the
specialist schools to the local and national systems in
which they are embedded.
relevant to assessing a policy’s success, as well as its
interpretation, is likely to appear differently from different
value positions. Like its predecessor, the present
Government claims that a standard, uniform curriculum
ignores both the real differences in children’s aptitudes
and interests, and the increasing cultural heterogeneity
of modern societies. This Briefing Paper has not
presented a counter-case for uniformity. But its
conclusions, summarised at the outset, indicate grounds
for caution about the effectiveness and fairness of a
policy which successive Governments have vigorously
promoted.
Education policy cannot be determined by research
because the priorities it represents are so largely a
matter of value-judgements. Even evidence thought
